In the years between the two World
Wars, the Zionist organization grew to be the most influential social and
political factor in Jewish life in Europe.
The historic possibility which the
Balfour Declaration and the San Remo Conference offered the Jews, to build a
Jewish homeland in Palestine, strengthened the value and influence of the
Zionist movement, but also imposed tremendously hard duties and responsibilities
on the organization and its leaders. As
Hitlerian influence grew, and especially when Hitler came to power in Germany
and racist slogans spread like wildfire, Zionist dilemmas weighed all the more
on the life of the Jews in danger in Europe.
Zionism and Palestine ceased to be the affair of Zionists alone. The heated debates in the Zionist camp had
already left the realm of theoretical party disputes.
With very few exceptions (Lithuania,
Romania), the influence of Zionism and Zionist leaders was nowhere as
conspicuous as in Poland. The
overwhelming majority of the Jewish community, a population of more than three
million, was well-disposed to Zionism, and sought rescue in immigration to
Palestine. Unyielding in the fierce
battle against Poland’s antisemitic direction, most Polish Jews, especially the
youth, knew that only in Palestine would they find salvation. Every dilemma, each hardship and obstacle on
the path to realizing the Zionist ideal, became a vital question for the Jewish
masses.
Haynt
played an active role in the life, suffering and joys of the Zionist movement,
and covered the event not as an outside, passive observer or neutral,
professional reporter, but as a participating agent. As a democratic Jewish newspaper from the progressive, politically-oriented,
nationally-conscious part of Polish Jewry, Haynt
marched together with the liberal and radical Zionist wing of the organization
with regard to the Zionist question and in matters relating to building the
State of Israel.
The substantive Zionist problems
which, in the years between the Wars, provoked heated debates among the Jews in
Poland were: the expansion of the
Jewish Agency for Erets Yisrael, the transfer agreement (Ha’avarah), the murder of Chaim Arlozorov and the proposal for the
partition of Palestine. Of the larger
Jewish issues, the project to create the World Jewish Congress garnered a lot
of attention – and sharply divided opinions.
Let us now examine Haynt’s
position in the controversy, and the publication’s role in the decisions to be
made.
In the 1920s, a battle was conducted in the Zionist world around the proposal made by Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952) to expand the Jewish Agency for Erets Yisrael. When Weizmann made this suggestion in 1923, the economic situation in Palestine was difficult. Workers were without jobs, teachers were not paid their salaries, settlers went hungy. All economic life was at a standstill. Weizmann travelled to America to raise money, but the American Jews of the time were not very interested in Zionism and Palestine, and his campaign met with little success. He saw that the Zionist ideal was at stake, that precisely iat the moment when Jews, after 2,000 years, were offered the possibility to build a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the Zionists alone could not raise enough money to finance construction of the State.
Consequently, Weizmann suggested to interest the
non-Zionist elements among world Jewry’s leaders, and first among them in the
United States, in practical work in Palestine.
His plan was to invite prominent Jewish leaders from outside the
movement to participate in the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which, according to
the British Mandate definition, had become the organ responsible for the work
of construction. The participation of
Zionists and non-Zionists in the Agency had to be on an equal basis, and the
term « fifty-fifty » was one of the points which met with harsh
criticism.
As the President of the World Zionist Organization,
Charim Weizmann bent under the burden of the crisis in Palestine : he bore responsibility for the movement,
and sought means to involve the people as a whole in the work for a country, in
order to save the Jewish settlement in Palestine (the yishuv). The tragic questions wrested from him, « Where are
you, Jewish populace ?, » « Jewish nation, what have you
done ? » (help build the Jewish homeland), thrilled the hearts of the
masses, but the hearts of the wealthy Jews remained cold and Weizmann believed
that if he could succeed in interesting them personally in the work of the
Jewish Agency as equal partners, they would feel responsible for building the
State of Israel, and would arrange the necessary finances.
This suggestion provoked a storm in the
movement. Opinions differed especially
sharply among the General Zionists.
Opponents wanted to retain the popular character of the Zionist
organization, and feared the plutocrats, who kept thir distance from the Jewish
masses, often took negotiations with governments into their own hands, and
answered to no one. On the other side,
the more practical elements, who gave due consideration to the Zionist
Organization’s limited possibilities, supported Weizmann’s proposal.
For the Jewish community of Poland, the problem of
a Jewish homeland in Palestine was a problem of creating a safe haven. Zionism, Zionist work, the crisis in
Palestine : for a Polish Jew,
these were not abstract concepts but specific problems in which he was
implicated personally and by blood ties.
It’s no wonder then that the battle for and against Weizmann’s proposal
involved large numbers of people. The
opposition was led by Itzhak Grinbaum and the radical Zionist group Al-haMishmar; supporters of the proposal
were members of the group Et-Livnot
which represented the more conservative, petit bourgeois elements of Polish
Zionism. Et-Livnot believed that private initiative was essential in
building a state constructively, and that the urban element, the retailer and
the artisan, was just as useful for the country as the collective contribution
of the agricultural settlers and the laborers.
Et-Livnot felt generally
wronged, and complained that the Congresses designated proportionally greater
amounts for kibbutzim, that the
administrative Zionist organs privileged the labor elements to the detriment of
the middle class. Consequently, they
believed that were Weizmann’s proposal to be accepted, the new partners –
themselves big businessmen and manufacturers – would be more sympathetic to their
demands and would then modify the position of the Jewish Agency toward the
nature of labor in Palestine.
As usual when he was committed to a political
battle, Itzhak Grinbaum was indefatigable in the debate over expanding the
Jewish Agency ; and as always, here too he accepted no compromise. In innumerable articles published in Haynt, Grinbaum analyzed the proposal in
all its possible aspects and criticized it sharply. The arguments he exposed in Haynt
as well as in open meetings were :
that the well-off Jews, the « moneyed Jews » and the
« Jewish bigshots » of all countries, and especially in America, were
assimilated. Their world-view is
completely alien to us, their thoughts are not our kind of reasoning. They are removed from Jewish life and do not
understand our needs. They do not know
Zionism, have no notion of its program and ideas, and will not defend ithe
Zionist perspective to the Mandate authority.
Grinbaum feared that the « Jewish bigwigs » would sooner be
swayed by the attitudes of their governments toward England, rather than
keeping in mind the interests of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
From an economic standpoint, Grinbaum extrapolated
the argument that, with no particular understanding of the national renaissance
of the Jewish people, the future partners would not remain active enough in
safeguarding Zionism’s basic principles :
collecting money to increase Jewish land-ownership in Palestine ;
securing new labor situations for pioneers, building new kibbutzim ; spreading the Hebrew
language – all that would be insubstantial for them. At best Palestine would be for them yet another country to which
one must give charity to help poor Jews.
For Grinbaum, it was illusory to believe that the
« fity-fifty » partners would mobilize the funds necessary for
Palestine. His opinion was not
unfounded. In the 1920s, a large number
of American Jews were absorbed in financing the Soviet government’s plan for Jewish
colonies in the Ukraine and Crimea. In
fact, this was a political diversion of the Bolsheviks, led by the Yevsektsye, which sought to draw the
Jewish masses away from the Zionist ideal.
The Joint Distribution Committee, in New York, budgeted a million
dollars to finance the plan, but the result was negligeable : only 15,000 Jewish families settled in
Southern Russia. It was clear that the
plan was a failure. In 1929, the Moscow
government went a step further and published a decree concerning the creation
of an autonomous Jewish republic in Birobidjan. Once again, Jews in America, both the wealthy and the laborers,
were enlisted in fundraising to finance the mirage of building a
brand-spanking-new Jewish settlement somewhere in a distant region beyond the
legendary « mountains of darkness, » where not one Jew had ever set
foot. And once again, American Jews
gave generously : but for
Palestine, contributions from America were meager.[1]
But Weizmann was not convinced. He understood, in terms of realpolitik, that the Balfour
Declaration alone would not create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but that
Zionism’s success depended on the extent of the practical work of building the
country. He was not looking for
political declarations but for new, powerful Jewish values. One more kibbutz,
one more moshav, one more workshop or
factory, more territory in Jewish hands – these, he believed, would be more
decisive than any new political achievements and manifestations, however
important they might be and however lovely they might sound. Weizmann had a reply to his
opponents : « You can wait,
but I believe that the struggle is such that we must wait no more. »
The debates, fraught with increasing tension,
lasted six years. When the proposal was
finally adopted in 1929, during the 16th Congress, both sides among the
Zionists remained disappointed. Life
had shown that supporters as well as opponents had overestimated the
non-Zionist partners : they too
were unable to mobilize the capital required.
Haynt provided extensive coverage of the important
Zionist debate. The newspaper was filled
with reports from open meetings and the debates which took place in closed
sessions, and enabled particular groups in the movement to publish their
positions, but Haynt’s sympathies lay
with Al-haMishmar, Itshok Grinbaum’s
radical group, which was, so to speak, the first among all the Zionist groups Haynt dealt with directly.
Dr. Joshua Gottlieb, one of the leaders of Et-Livnot, was the sole contributor to
the newspaper to share the perspective of his group, and he complained that Haynt gave preferential treatment to
Grinbaum and Al-haMishmar. Already at this point one could discern the
beginning of the conflict which would precipitate his departure from Haynt in 1935 (see Chapter 20).
In 1933, a tragedy occurred which provoked a deeper schism in Jewish communities around the world. On June 16, Chaim Arlozorov was murdered on the beach in Tel Aviv. Arlozorov (1899-1933) was the young director of the Jewish Agency’s political section, and leader of the Labor movement in Israel. Arlozorov was an exceptionally competent person, energetic and popular not just in his own Poale Zion party. At 34, he occupied very important positions in its direction, and the Zionist movement had placed great hopes in him.
Two days after the murder, three members of the
Revisionist party in Israel were arrested:
Tzvi Rosenblatt, Abraham Stavsky and Abba Akhimeir. The first two were completely unknown
outside of Revisionist circles, but Akhimeir had written for the Israeli press.
The fact of Arlozorov’s murder itself shocked Jews
everywhere, but that three Jews should be guilty of the deed terrified Jews
worldwide. The Revisionists protested,
sure that the accusation was false, a blood libel, certain that neither the men
arrested, as individuals, nor the party, had any connection to the crime. But opinion in the larger strata of Jewish
society was that the men arrested were the murderers.
In Poland the polemic was particularly
inflamed. Old friends became lifelong
enemies ; in the Zionist camp, war between brothers grew entrenched. People believed that the murder had been
planned and carried out by irresponsible hotheads, fanatics, who took it upon
themselves as a mission to avenge themselves on Chaim Arlozorov for the Ha’avarah (transfer) agreement with
Germany.
When Hitler came to power and anti-semitic
persecutions began in Germany, the problem arose of how to make emigration
possible for German Jews. The Nazi
government was driving the Jews to leave Germany, on the one hand, and on the
other, would not allow them to transfer their property abroad, when they sought
to emigrate. The intention of the Ha’avarah plan was that Jews who wanted
to move to Palestine could save at least a part of their fortune – not in cash,
but in machinery and toher goods.
Emigration to Palestine was harshly limited for pioneers, but people
possessing 1,000 pounds sterling were considered capitalists and could move
with no difficulties.
The painful discussion of the project, and the negotiations
with Nazi Germany angered the Jewish masses.
The opposition held that doing business with Nazi Germany was
unacceptable under any circumstances.
The most bitter opponents were the
Revisionists. The furiously-charged
atmosphere of these impassioned debates carried over into the Jewish press,
where the articles were often no less venomous than the bitter polemics
surrounding the Transfer between supporters and opponents within the Zionist
movement.
Although Haynt
had proclaimed an anti-German boycott in Poland, and supported it in numerous
articles, the paper was in favor of the Ha’avarah,
defending its position in purely practical terms, demonstrating that however
repulsive the thought might be of trafficking with Nazi Germany, priority must
be accorded to the potential benefits the Transfer could offer German
Jewry. It’s one thing to transact
normal business and help the German economy ; but it’s quite another to
help save the German Jews. German Jews
had no choice. Either the Nazis would
confiscate their fortunes and leave them, at best, expelled as beggars without
a red cent, or they could salvage some portion of their wealth thanks to the
Transfer. They would emigrate to
Palestine and begin a new life, and the country would gain a new, imposing,
constructive element, which would strengthen the settlement in all respects,
not only in strictly economic terms.
Arlozorov was assassinated just as he returned to
Tel Aviv after finishing the negotiations, and the suspicion was, therefore,
that his killers had carried out the attack on the leader of the political
section of the Jewish Agency, responsible for the negotiations, in order to
show their opposition to the Ha’avarah
agreement.
Jewish society and the Jewish press in Poland, for
the most part, saw this as the reason behind Arlozorov’s murder. Haynt
also subscribed to this opinion, which it published in various articles.
When the three suspects came to trial, two were
liberated in the first instance, and the third, Abraham Stavsky, was freed on
appeal. The secret of Arlozorov’s
murder was never really clarified. As
for the Ha’avarah agreement, the
debate continued to rage for several years, until its final approval at the
20th Zionist Congress, in Luzerne, in 1937.
Before the mood engendered by the lengthy debate over the Transfer Agreement had really been dispelled, the Zionist world embraced a fresh /new painful discussion of the historical right of the Jewish people to Palestine. The battle was over the British plan to divide Palestine into two states : one Arab, one Jewish. The project was elaborated by a Royal Commission, sent from London to investigate the situation in Palestine after the bloody Arab terror of 1936. The Commission came to the conclusion that there was no choice other than to divide the country between Arabs and Jews. The proposal became known in 1937, and once again the arguments were inflamed, impulsive, grim and embittered.
Opponents of the Partition criticized the plan
from both political and economic standpoints, but primarily with ideological
arguments and religious motivations, which had popular appeal. They hammered at the emotional feelings
which the Jew absorbs from childhood on, in kheder,
and bears deep in his soul for his whole life, no matter whether he is frum (devout) or not. They demanded their right to the country, as
it was promised to the Jews, and categorically rejected the notion of a
partition.(114) The argument of the opposition
was sound, because the result of the plan as proposed would have been for no
more than 10% of the historical territory of Palestine to be designated a
Jewish state. Practically all of the
sites sacred to Jews would have been on the Arab side. Jerusalem would not figure in the Jewish
apportionment.
From the beginning, Haynt supported the proponents of the Partition. As on many other occasions, for example in
the case of the Ha’avarah debate, Haynt stood with the pragmatic Zionist
leaders who were committed to this offer, not because it was so attractive, but
because the newspaper saw in the Partition a solution for the burning needs of
the Jewish masses. While supporting the
plan, then, Haynt nevertheless did
not deny its many drawbacks, nor that it fell far short of the generations-long
dreams of the Jewish people and of Zionist ideals. However the journal felt that the objective situation of the Jews
in Hitler’s epoch made it absolutely necessary to accept the Partition proposal
with all its faults, and to adopt it as quickly as possible.
It was a time laden with Jewish troubles, but the
world remained indifferent. The British
government had reduced to a minimum emigration to Palestine (aliyah), and the governments of other
countries had slammed their doors and locked their gates against the Jews. Advocates of the Partition, including Haynt, argued that even a small Jewish
state would be a home for the refugees, who had nowhere to run from
Hitler. In the many articles Haynt published, the authors recognized
the emotional and religious reservations, but insisted that the fate of the
Parition should not be imperiled for the sake of tradition, sentiments and
dreams.
Standing alone in the supporters’ camp, Haynt gave opponents the chance to
explain to the larger public why they were against the plan. The controversy found an echo in Haynt’s jubilee volume (1908-1938). Itshok Grinbaum contributed an exhaustive
essay defending the Partition project.
The opposing position was represented in the text of a memorandum which
M[enahem] M. Ussishkin had submitted to the British Commission for the
Partition of Palestine. When the
Jubilee Book was published, the matter was no longer current, since the British
government had withdrawn the offer of a partition, and shortly thereafter
released its White Paper, which effectively ended all emigration.(115)
This is how the chance to provide the victims of
Nazism with a safe haven was squandered in the eleventh hour before the coming
Holocaust. Had the plan for partition
been adopted as soon as the proposal was made, without all the drawn-out
polemics, the newly-created state, however small, would have accepted a large
number of the refugees who had escaped from Hitlerism, just as the State of
Israel admitted the survivors after the war.
And as fate would have it, the debate around the
partition would be the last great ideological controversy over Palestine in Haynt before the newspaper fell silent
forever.
When Nazi propaganda against the Jewish people and
anti-Jewish persecution began to spread from Germany to other European
countries, a group of Jewish leaders decided to create a representative
organization to fight this danger.
Spearheading the initiative were Rabbi Stephen Wise (1874-1949) in America
and Dr. Nakhum Goldman in Europe. They
proposed creating a World Jewish Congress to represent Jewish interests and to
organize a global counter-attack against Hitlerism.
Their project met with a mixed reception in Jewish
society. Supporters hoped that the
World Congress would succeed in getting responsible Jewish leaders to focus on
its programs, which would put an end to the independent actions undertaken by
various inappropriate individuals and organizations, with no understanding of
the guidelines, methods and goals of the actions, and which would often do more
harm than good. This is, however, not
to say that opponents were lacking.
Opponents of a politics of world Jewry – a concept
of which the Congress would be the expression – primarily stayed aloof. Others, proponents of lobbying, did not want
to diverge from their methods and adopt modern political actions. There were also those who were afraid that
since the organizers were leading Zionists, the Congress would be an instrument
of the Zionist movement. We also did
not lack for other groups which saw the World Jewish Congress as competition
for them, and discovered reasons of « principle » to justify their
opposition.
Baruch Zuckerman (1881-1970), one of the leaders
of Poale Zion in America, went to Poland on a mission for the Congress to
recover the largest Jewish community in Europe, directly subject to racist
assault. He encountered significant
difficulties. The Agudah, the half- and
fully-assimilated intellectuals, the plutocrats, the great Jewish merchants and
manufacturers, various « apolitical » groups and, of course, the
Bund, which did not subscribe to the interests of world Jewry and always
pursued its own class politics : all
took a stand against participating in the troubled founding conference of the
World Jewish Congress.
The
Jewish press generally reflected the mood of the community. Of all the newspapers, only Haynt advocated creating the Jewish
World Congress. The paper saw in the
tumultuous administrative body the appropriate democratic organ to defend the
rights of the Jews in Hitler’s era. Haynt wrote that such a central
political body would demonstrate to the world Jewish unity in such an
emergency, would coordinate the resistance to Hitlerism, and bring order and organizational
discipline to the counter-attack. The
perspective defended in the articles was that it was important for a large
delegation of Polish Jews to participate in the founding conference.
Haynt’s systematic campaign of clarification had a
positive influence, and contributed to the success of Zuckerman’s mission. At the founding conference of the World
Jewish Congress, held in Geneva in 1936, the message of Polish Jews found full
expression. The delegation from Poland
was one of the most active. Haynt devoted a lot of space to the
scheduled speeches and debates, and published letters and telegrams on the
negotiations in the committees. After
the Conference, Haynt took every
opportunity to inform its readers of the actions undertaken by the elected
executive board in an alliance of nations and with individual governments.
[1] Haynt
attacked the Birobidjan plan from the first.
The newspaper pointed out what history has demonstrated : that no plan for a Jewish settlement in any country other than the Land of Israel
had ever succeeded, and Birobidjan would be no exception.
Haynt revealed Birobidjan as a Muscovite ploy to colonize Jews on the border with China, in order to make the risky, uninhabited regions of the Far East into another defense post against the possible incursion of the Japanese – who, at the time, a scant fifty years ago, were threatening the Chinese Empire along the Soviet borders, just as the Chinese are threatening Soviet Russia today.